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risks of further delays in the recapitalisation
process.4 Recently the Gauteng Taxi Council
(Gataco) staged a protest raising its concerns about
the ongoing delays.5
Indecisive policy directives and implementation
delays are hazardous in this volatile industry, with
its history of endemic violence and continuing
instability. When the taxi industry emerged in the
late 1980s it was viewed as the flagship of black
entrepreneurship. But from the outset it was beset
by violence. To create a niche, taxi operators
initially had to defy apartheid machinations and
political tensions. Then and now, operators have
also had to deal with poor funding and chronic
competition between operators. Indeed, taxi
operators have battled for their “place in the sun’”.6
At the heart of the problem is the persistent struggle
over control of this multi-billion rand industry that
carries over 60% of South Africa’s commuters.
Given its troubled and often violent history,
decisive policy direction from government in the
form of a comprehensive regulatory framework
One of the most pressing transport-relatedchallenges facing government is toestablish a taxi industry that is safe and
reliable; an industry that will contribute to its own
growth and to that of the country’s economy. To this
end, the taxi recapitalisation programme initiated in
1999 was an important intervention. However, the
process appears to have run aground. 
Earlier this year, a Department of Transport official
was quoted in the media as saying that government
might scrap recapitalisation.1 Later during the year,
the MEC for safety and transport in KwaZulu-Natal
announced a proposal to scrap both the bidding
process for the new vehicles and the electronic
management system.2 In addition, the transport
parliamentary portfolio committee has recently
raised questions around the affordability of the
proposed vehicles, and the committee chair
believes the process must be revisited.3
Pitted against this apparent reticence to restructure
the industry, the South African National Taxi
Council (Santaco) has warned parliament about the
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For over a decade the taxi industry has been heavily embroiled in conflicts that have claimed thousands of
lives. At the heart of the problem is the persistent struggle over control of this multi-billion rand industry that
carries over 60% of South Africa’s commuters. Given its troubled and often violent history, and its substantial
share of the commuter market, clearer government commitment is needed in the form of adequate investment
and implementation of a comprehensive and participatory recapitalisation programme. 
(encompassing safety and security, as well as
finance components) is necessary to prevent the taxi
industry from degenerating further.
Origins of the taxi industry 
The minibus taxi industry emerged in the wake of
the apartheid government’s policy of economic
deregulation, initiated in 1987. Prior to
deregulation, black taxi operators had to defy
apartheid laws and strict regulations that were
prejudicial to blacks. 
Transport regulations – chiefly embodied in the
Motor Carrier Transportation Act of 1930 –
stipulated that no transportation of goods or
passengers was allowed without permission from a
Local Road Transportation Board (LRTB). Obtaining
a permit from the LRTB was all but impossible for
black operators who, falling under the
discriminatory influx control system, found it
difficult to prove that they had a good formal
employment record, had lived in the magisterial
district as legally registered tenants for a number of
years, and were in possession of a Daily Labourer’s
Permit. 
In effect, the system meant that over 90% of taxi
permit applications by blacks were rejected. Under
such circumstances, most black taxi operators
operated illegally using private saloon vehicles as
taxis.  
Indeed, even when an applicant did manage to
qualify for a taxi permit, the act only authorised the
use of small cars (restricted to carrying four
passengers) and there was a quota system allowing
only a limited number of licences to be issued each
year. As a result, and because alternative forms of
public transport – mainly buses and trains – were
inadequate and expensive, demand for taxis far
outstripped supply. 
For this reason, from the early 1980s onwards, taxi
operators began using larger ‘kombi’ minibuses that
could carry up to 15 passengers. Until formal
deregulation in 1987, such taxis were illegal. Yet
they were popular among black commuters
because, unlike other public transport options, they:
• ran late-night services; 
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• travelled to out-of-the-way places;
• picked up commuters from, and dropped them 
back at, their homes;
• charged reasonable fares;
• made convenient stops on long distances; and
• cut down time spent in long queues at bus and 
train stations.
As the number of illegal kombi taxis began
escalating, changes were occurring in the apartheid
state that had a profound effect on the industry. As
early as the 1970s, the government began to view
its near-monopoly on public transportation, which
had initially been utilised to protect and prop up
the South African Transport Services (SATS),7 as an
economic liability. 
The 1977 Van Breda Commission of Inquiry into
the Road Transportation Bill found that South Africa
“had reached a stage of economic and industrial
development which enabled it to move towards a
freer competition in transportation”.8 The
Commission’s findings reflected a neo-liberal shift
in economic policy that resulted in generalised
deregulation, commercialisation and privatisation,
beginning in the late 1970s. 
Within the commuter sector, the consumer and bus
boycotts of the 1980s were viewed as further
evidence of the imperative to deregulate transport.
Such boycotts also had the unanticipated effect of
increasing demand for alternative forms of
transport. This was because during this period,
buses and trains were frequently attacked by
youths, forcing commuters to use taxis. At the same
time, there were widespread retrenchments in
various industries due to, inter alia, political
activism and disinvestment. 
The fledgling taxi industry became one of the few
enterprises that could accommodate retrenched
workers as well as aspiring black businessmen.
Thus, by the mid 1980s, all that was needed for the
industry to realise its potential was the formal
deregulation of transport.
Deregulation
In 1985, the National Transport Study (NTPS)
released its report,9 concluding that the highly
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regulatory framework of existing transport policy
was “contrary to the principles of national
economic policy that emphasise the role of
competition”.10 Based on the NTPS findings and the
recommendations of the Competition Board,11
which proposed the immediate and blanket
deregulation of the taxi industry, the White Paper
on Transport Policy of 1987 along with the
Transport Deregulation Act of 1988, effectively
legalised the 16-seater minibus taxis.  
Permit enforcement ceased to be a priority and the
industry was soon flooded with aspirant drivers,
resulting in heightened competition for passengers
and routes as too many operators entered the
domain too rapidly. This market ‘free-for-all’ was
exacerbated by corrupt officials who turned a blind
eye to traffic enforcement and vehicle
roadworthiness, meaning that from the outset, issues
of safety and security were sidelined. 
Alongside a bid to ‘capitalise’ portions of the black
community, the sudden deregulation of transport
became a means of complementing the state’s
broader destabilisation strategies in the run-up to
negotiations by exacerbating socio-economic and
political tensions within black communities.12 In the
words of James Chapman, long-time consultant to
the taxi industry, “they [taxi operators] were divided
by the ... [apartheid] government and violence was
encouraged”.13 Against the backdrop of escalating
violence during apartheid’s final years, the stage
was set for the violent taxi wars that came to
dominate the deregulated industry.
Taxi wars
An almost immediate and far-reaching consequence
of rapid deregulation was the rise of taxi
associations, which have been directly associated
with the violence that has shadowed the industry
since 1987. As one of the first avenues for black
capital accumulation, the taxi industry quickly
became a contested terrain, swamped with
operators hoping to become rich. While some were
able to ‘strike it lucky’, for the most part the
industry was characterised by exploitation and
aggressive competition between operators
attempting to poach passengers and ply the same
routes. 
In the absence of state regulation, groups of
operators banded together to form local taxi
associations, which intervened to regulate loading
practices and prices. It was not long, however,
before taxi associations began to use their
organisational strength to extract income,
commonly through the use of violence.14 Typical of
this violent protection of spheres of interest is the
following remark by a taxi operator in Johannesburg
in 1988: “We will not succumb – they must operate
in their own area. We will fight back and defend
ourselves.”15
Between 1987 and 1994 official efforts to deal with
the taxi industry were almost non-existent. When
violence erupted the government invariably became
part of the problem instead of the solution. At best,
police behaviour during the late-apartheid period
was negligent. At worst, the police used their
positions of authority to promote rifts between
associations and to destabilise black communities.
In many areas, the police were implicated in
attacks or were in other ways partisan. More
generally, by their calculated inaction – which
included a failure to disarm attackers or to respond
to warnings of immanent attacks – the police
fanned the conflict.16
However, contrary to many expectations, the cycles
of taxi violence fomented during the late-apartheid
period did not end with the demise of apartheid.
Indeed, unlike other forms of political violence that
diminished or disappeared after 1994, taxi violence
actually escalated in the immediate post-1994
period. 
In the years following the 1994 elections, the
Human Rights Committee (a now defunct NGO that
monitored political violence throughout the 1980s
and 1990s) observed outbreaks of violent taxi wars
around Johannesburg, Soweto, the East Rand and
Pretoria in Gauteng, around Durban in KwaZulu
Natal, in the Eastern Cape around Bisho and King
Williams Town and Umtata, and in Limpopo and
the North West Province. 
Although widespread and seemingly random, it was
notable that the most persistent conflicts occurred
between associations using long distance routes.
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later, recapitalisation is still a pipedream. A number
of problems have emerged both from the side of
government and the industry.
From the government’s perspective, two issues
continue to dog the proposed recapitalisation
strategy. First, there is the question of who
represents the taxi industry. Second, there are
concerns over the cost implications of
recapitalisation.
Santaco, which was formed in August 1998 as an
industry-driven response to the government’s failed
attempts to resolve taxi violence, has a
democratically elected council and claims to
represent the industry as a whole. However, shortly
after it was formed, a rival association, the National
Taxi Alliance (NTA), set up office and it, too,
claimed to be the mouthpiece of the taxi industry. 
Tensions between the two bodies erupted almost
immediately and conflicts over representation
continue to cause problems for the recapitalisation
process. The existence of two associations both
claiming to represent and speak on behalf of the
taxi industry significantly complicates government’s
efforts to consult with and enter into binding
agreements with the industry.
Arguably of more concern to government are the
cost implications of the recapitalisation process. As
currently envisaged, to off-set the higher cost of the
larger vehicles and to ‘sell’ recapitalisation to
operators, government will contribute 20% of the
cost of each new vehicle as a ‘scrapping allowance’
for trading in or scrapping an existing taxi.
Government has set aside R4 billion for this
purpose, but the taxi industry is not satisfied with
this amount, proposing instead that government
should provide a 20% up-front subsidy as well as a
30% scrapping allowance. 
With over 100,000 taxis in the country, government
is concerned that this level of spending will exert
substantial pressure on the fiscus, leading recently
to suggestions that the programme might be
abandoned if there is an expectation of “an
additional funding requirement above the R4 billion
mark”.17
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 10 DECEMBER 200416 SEKHONYANE AND DUGARD
Many of these conflicts were inter-provincial,
involving long distance taxi associations such as the
Lethlabile Taxi Organisation (LTO), the Federated
Local and Long Distance Taxi Association (Felldta)
and the South African Local and Long Distance Taxi
Association (Salldta). 
Another defining feature of this increasingly
sophisticated form of violence was the mutative
nature of the associations and the tendency for
smaller associations to change affiliates in favour of
the more violent and financially stable ones.
Between 1997 and 1999 some of the worst conflicts
took place at the Rietgat Taxi Rank in Soshanguve
and at the nearby Mapobane station. Such conflicts
revealed that there was more to taxi violence than
politics alone.
Attempts to restructure the taxi industry
The persistence of taxi wars after 1994 forced the
post-apartheid government to intervene in the
industry. In 1995 government established the
National Taxi Task Team (NTTT) to deliberate over
the causes of, and potential solutions to, the
violence. In 1996 the NTTT released its first report,
recommending the re-regulation of the taxi industry
as a matter of urgency. 
However, by the time of the finalisation of the
NTTT process in 1998, it was apparent that
powerful interests had become vested in the mafia-
like use of violence as a means of suppressing
competition. Many taxi associations – particularly a
handful of key supra-associations (called ‘mother-
bodies’, to which local associations were affiliated)
– actively opposed the government’s attempts at re-
regulation, sparking an escalation in taxi related
violence between 1998 and 1999.
Mindful of the apparent failure of its re-regulation
plans, in 1999 government changed its focus to
restructuring the industry through the
recapitalisation process. In essence, the
recapitalisation strategy aims to recreate the taxi
industry from scratch, phasing out the 16-seater
minibus taxis in favour of new 18- and 35-seaters,
and introducing smart card technology to eliminate
cash from commuter transactions. However, both
processes have run into problems and, seven years
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From the industry’s point of view, the proposed
scrapping allowance is not enough incentive to
convert to the new system. At a cost of more than
R300,000 for a new taxi, meaning maintenance
leases of around R15,000 per month per vehicle,
operators are demanding an equitable subsidy
system, which they calculate should amount to
around R10 billion per year. However, the treasury
believes that this sort of subsidy is unaffordable.18
Santaco is also opposed to the larger 35-seater
vehicles being proposed by government, preferring
a maximum number of 29 seats per taxi, and it
does not see the need for every vehicle to have
disabled access. At this stage it remains unclear
whether the recapitalisation deadline of 2008 will
be realised. 
What should be done?
South Africa’s taxi industry has come a long way
since its inception as a result of deregulation in
1987. However, as the title of Colleen McCaul’s
book suggests, it has been No Easy Ride19 for taxi
operators. Government investment and a
reinvigorated, consultative, recapitalisation process
are needed to prevent the industry from sliding into
anarchy and disrepair.
Government investment
The contributions of the taxi industry to
employment and to South Africa’s economy are
substantial and should be acknowledged by
adequate government investment. At present, bus
companies get an annual subsidy of R2,1 billion
from the department of transport, and rail
companies receive R2,4 billion. Yet taxis, which
command at least 60% of the total commuter
market, receive no subsidy at all. 
Recapitalisation has the potential to stimulate
further economic activity in the transport sector as
well as in the “web of survivalist activity”20 that
surrounds taxi operations, and to create the basis
for a stable, safe industry that could stimulate new
sources of government revenue as the industry is
formalised and brought into the tax net. Failure to
invest in this critical industry is a short term
financial strategy that could cost the government
dearly in the long run.
Consultation
A new process of consultation with taxi operators
and their representatives, along the lines of the
NTTT, is necessary to determine who represents the
industry and what their needs are. In the first
instance, Santaco’s dissatisfaction with the
proposed 35-seater vehicle should be taken
seriously. Not only does Santaco represent tens of
thousands of taxi operators, but the international
experience of jeepneys in the Philippines, matatus
in Kenya and trotros in Ghana suggests that smaller
vehicles are optimum for informal public
transport.21
The taxi industry is a key player in South Africa’s
society and economy and should not be neglected.
Government should acknowledge its vital role
through adequate investment and by realising a
comprehensive and participatory recapitalisation
programme. In the final analysis, given its share of
the commuter market, it is necessary that
government engages meaningfully with taxi
operators and makes sufficient funding available to
properly formalise the taxi industry. 
Postscript
Shortly before this publication was printed,
government announced that the long delayed taxi
recapitalisation programme will be implemented
from the beginning of the 2005/6 financial year.
This is a significant step and will hopefully assist to
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